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Narrating(-)Life – In Lieu of an Introduction1 
 
Stefan Herbrechter 
 
‘Narrating life’ – this phrase warrants some investigation. Who is the ‘agency’ or the 
‘subject’ in this phrase, ‘narrating’ or ‘life’? Who, or what, is narrating life? Which 
would mean that life was an object (or being subjected to narration), as if life was ‘in 
need of’ narrating in order to become what it ‘is’. Or, instead, might life be the narrator 
or the narrating instance: life that expresses itself through narration? In both cases, life 
‘as such’ would be something ‘outside’ narration (while being in need of it) but, as 
such, it would remain invisible (at least for the (human?) observer). However insistent 
the questioning, life would not be able to yield its secrets ‘outside’ or ‘without’ 
narration. But life would always be ventriloquized by some (human?) narrator – unless, 
by some magical process of inscription, life was to do the narrating and writing ‘itself’ 
(which would presuppose a ‘self’, or at least some ‘sense of self’, self-reflexivity and 
thus consciousness, or at least iterability, in the Derridean sense – life itself). 
There is, another way of reading the phrase – narrating life – life that is narrated. 
Following this third avenue, one might wish to hyphenate the two components: 
narrating-life. One might argue that this would be quite a surprising but also not 
eintirely foolish definition of literature. The ‘author’ (Roland Barthes’s ‘scriptor’) 
would have a narrating-life (and, presumably, a non-narrating one besides). The text 
would show or open up the possibility of a narrating-life (as well as a ‘narrated-life’). 
In so far as a text is some form of ‘writing’ or ‘inscription’, narrating-life would be 
quasi-synonymous with it. 
Without discarding any of these, what all these possibilities provide for is an 
immense expansion of the meaning of life writing. Narrating life – understood either as 
the writer’s task or as the curious agency acquired by life to tell its own stories – raises 
the question of who: who does the narrating? Who is the subject of so-called ‘life 
writing’? Life writing – formerly autobiography? – is a literary but maybe also non-
literary, scientific, ecological genre.  So, to what extent could life-writing be understood 
                                                 
1  Some aspects of this essay have appeared in Stefan Herbrechter (2012) 
‘Posthumanism, Subjectivity, Autobiography’, Subjectivity 5.3: 327-47. 
as that special kind of genre and practice that may offer a privileged site (or a 
‘laboratory’?) for imagining and ‘emploting’ life, or ways of narrating life? Would life 
express itself necessarily through writing or fiction? And, the reverse, is there be any 
fiction that would not be somehow about life, or at least a life? All the difference of 
course lies in the indefinite article: a life or life (Life?). That’s life! Nobody would say: 
that’s a life, or maybe only in the sense: here goes another life… i.e. another death. Life 
as this enigmatic life force, the animation of the inanimate, the divine spark, or spirit, 
this je-ne-sais-quoi that transforms dead ‘matter’ into, what exactly? Whereas a life, 
‘my’ life, this countable (countable to a degree that it is always unique – this life, mine, 
the only one I have, but which of course isn’t ‘mine’ at all, strictly speaking) finite, 
irreversible, ‘tragic’ and laughable period of time that I must narrate to myself to make 
it mine – this little life, this fallen life of a demiurge is the proper subject of 
autobiography. Life, the capital one, the cyclic, always evolving and (self)transforming, 
‘energetic’ principle or force – that would call for life writing (or even life-writing or, 
ultimately, lifewriting – one word).  
The relationship between fiction or literature and life is an age-old theme: what 
happens to life, what happens to ‘my’ life, while I’m narrating it? Is the ‘I’ who does 
the narrating (regardless in which person ‘I’ am narrating my story, it is always an ‘I’ 
that is being told) the same ‘I’ as the one that is narrated? The gap between ‘I’ and ‘I’, 
in fact, that’s where life, the real one, the living one, must be taking place. Narrating 
and living, in fact, mutually exclude each other. While I’m writing I’m living 
elsewhere, or my ‘body’ at least is living ‘elsewhere’. Literature – auto-bio-graphy, life 
writing – would not only be a substitute for life – a lesser (or, indeed, higher) form of 
life – it would positively exclude living ‘as such’, if living were to be understood as 
‘being at one with oneself’, ‘mere’ being, even less than Dasein (being-there). Might 
this be the special appeal but maybe also the deep mistrust or even hatred (‘at least since 
Plato’) of literature, fiction, poetry? That fact that literature ‘lives off’ life, that it 
parasites, replaces, virtualizes life ‘itself’? Literature or life (as Jorge Semprun (1997) 
so aptly and provocatively put it)? 
 Semprun’s question – l’écriture ou la vie? – arises out of a context in which life 
is at its most precarious, life at its ‘barest’, or where bioplitics turns into ‘zoopolitics’, 
namely the ‘death camp’. Zoopolitics and zoography – since Giorgio Agamben revived 
the ancient Greek distinction between bios and zoē – are concepts that deeply affect the 
notion of life writing. What life is being narrated, or which of the two lives does the 
narrating – bios or zoē? One would assume that something conscious like an 
autobiography would be based on bios, or life-as-it-makes-sense-to-a-me. ‘I’ am the 
‘subject’ of (to?) ‘my’ life, which is of course based on a social process of negotiation 
with others (people, institutions, objects, environments etc.). Life writing in this sense 
is inextricable from ‘biopolitics’ because it is in itself an (auto- and hetero-)biopolitical 
act. Zoography is an entirely different matter. No ‘I’ can write its own zoography since 
the inscription process on life, a life, is always done at a level that goes beyond and 
remains below individual and traditional forms of agency. The life of zoē writes and 
‘narrates’ itself (through ‘my’ body). It is also a form of narrating life, but one that no 
longer distinguishes between human and nonhuman, object and subject, world and 
thing. It also goes beyond (or remains ‘below’ or ‘before’) any biopolitics, because of 
its purely processual and distributive, disseminal and transformative logic. The full 
meaning of the phrase ‘narrating life’, arises out of the difference and the interaction 
between bios and zoē and asks, more specifically of literature – that discourse most ‘in 
tune’ with narrativisation, one might say – how its imagination might affect and be 
affected by the emergence of a critical awareness of bio- and zoopolitics. Under the 
conditions of the global appropriation and strife over ‘life’ (as material, commodity, 
transcendental signified and signifier) how to carry on narrating? Under the conditions 
of a generalized biopolitics, what historical and contemporary mutations of literature, 
what strategies of immunity, mutation, and contagion of textual and critical practices 
do writers of fiction, literature, drama or poetry foreground in order to address and 
maybe even produce the future and/or the survival of literature or fiction and thus the 
narrating of ‘life’? 
Narrating life thus understood challenges all forms of writing, but literature in 
particular. It forces a return to writing as a ‘bio-logical’ act. It is organic, biopic, literally 
– if that were possible. Narrating as a bio-(logical, political, semiotic) act can only be 
thought in the terms of mutation, contagion and immunity. In focusing on new forms 
of life writing, e.g. posthuman (auto-)biographies, (science) fictional accounts of (alien) 
life forms and their transmutations, narratives and subjectivities without, after, or before 
humans, and practical contagions between real and fictional, literary and scientific, 
human and nonhuman discourse and the resistance to these – their specific (auto and 
hetero)immunisations. What kind of allergic reactions does narrating life produce 
today? What are the symptoms it provokes? 
 
 Subject to (a) Life 
 
I am developing… a sustainable brand of nomadic ethics. The starting point is 
the relentless generative force of bios and zoē and the specific brand of 
transspecies egalitarianism that they establish with the human. The ecological 
dimension of philosophical nomadism consequently becomes manifest and, 
with it, its potential ethical impact. It is a matter of forces as well as ethology… 
The vital politics of life as zoē, defined as a generative force, resets the terms 
of the debate and introduces an ecophilosophy of belonging that includes both 
species equality and posthumanist ethics. (Braidotti, 2008: 183) 
 
By way of making one small contribution to the current discussion on narrating life, I 
will return to the genre of auto-bio-graphy. All three ingredients of auto-bio-graphy are 
becoming increasingly unstable: autoaffection, the historicity and materiality of ‘life’, 
and the agency and subjectivity of writing. Affect studies, posthumanist theories of 
materialism, and deconstruction and new media theory have all been contributing to 
and commenting on this development. Within the history of auto-bio-graphy as a genre 
or mode of narrating the ‘story of a life’ the most recent shift has been the move from 
(auto)biography to the notion of ‘life writing’. Life, in turn, has become the main focus 
of current theories located between the (post)humanities, new media and the (life) 
sciences. It therefore seems appropriate to explore the fallout of these changes under 
the heading of ‘life writing’ (as outlined above). It is no coincidence that this is 
happening at a time when the effects of contemporary biopolitics are being discussed 
ever more urgently and controversially. 
In the context of contemporary literary criticism on life writing Gillian Whitlock 
raises the stakes by joining together the autobiographical and the human: “what it 
means to be human is a question that is fundamental to autobiographical narrative, and 
embedded in the history of autobiography in western modernity” (Whitlock, 2012: v). 
As soon as one narrates the life of the ‘human’ (i.e. no longer in the sense of a self-
evident ‘liberal humanist individual subject’) from the constructed vantage point of a 
no-longer-quite-human form of narration or narrator, one enters posthumanist territory 
and one begins narrating ‘posthuman’ lives, as Sidonie Smith explains: 
 
As the posthuman gets a life, it will be fascinating to observe and engage 
adaptations of narrative lives routed through an imaginary of surfaces, 
networks, assemblages, prosthetics, and avatars. (Smith, 2011: 571) 
 
The posthumanisation of life writing raises an infinity of questions. However what 
these questions share is the fact that they are all questions of life and death.  
Life writing and autobiography – always a popular genre – has been receiving 
renewed critical interest, and the ‘autobiographical’ – always at the heart of theory, 
especially deconstruction – has been thoroughly problematized. All its constituents, in 
fact, auto-bio-graphy, especially in a posthumanist context, have developed a life of 
their own, so to speak. The automatism of the prefix ‘auto-’, rather than simply shoring 
up some form of self-identity – a self writing itself – has turned against its self. The 
reflective narcissism that underlies any form of identity has been problematized by two 
very different ‘autos’: autoaffection and autoimmunity. 
 
The ‘bio’ in autobiography, under the condition of generalised biopolitics in the late 
20th and early 21st century referred to above has rendered the obvious materiality (or 
matter-reality) of life more precarious and more fleeting. It is becoming increasingly 
problematic to say: ‘this is “my” life.’ Instead, the Deleuzian (post-vitalist) impact has 
turned life into pure ‘immanence’; and it has transformed it into a precarious 
‘haecceity’. 
Likewise, the suffix ‘-graphy’ has shifted from designating a mere recording or 
inscription process – because of the ‘decentring’ of the subject of writing – towards an 
idea of writing whose agency is not that of a conscious or unconscious individual ego 
but has acquired a much more ‘distributed’ agency. 
This ongoing ‘deconstruction of auto-bio-graphy’ is an undoing of the humanist 
foundations of self-identity. The very idea of autobiography relies on a subject (or a 
narrator) who is capable of remembering, interpreting and identifying with his or her 
life story. It is a very specific form of embodiment that usually conveys trust in the 
impression that the subject of the narration is identical to the subject of the narrative. 
This is, in fact, what guarantees self-sameness, i.e. an assurance that ‘I’ am ‘me’. Many 
complications trouble this model of autobiographical consciousness, usually referred to 
as ‘Cartesian’: there are, first of all, the earlier blows against this self-conscious ‘I’ from 
the figures referred to earlier (whose work is sometimes grouped under the term 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’). Nietzsche critiques the objectivity and the truth of the 
subject through his notion of the ‘will to power’. Freud’s main claim is that the ego is 
not the master in its own house, i.e. the autobiographical ‘I’ cannot be trusted with its 
own story because it is partly written by other, namely unconscious, forces, under the 
influence of protective mechanisms, censorship and unconscious desires. Marx adds 
the idea that a subject is subject to ideologies and therefore not fully aware of its 
implication in larger political schemes, i.e. one could adapt Marx’s famous dictum and 
say: humans write their (autobiographical) stories but not under the conditions of their 
own making. Darwin, of course, detects another logic at work in human undertakings. 
There are at least two versions of autobiography in every human subject – the individual 
biography and the autobiography of the species, which stand in a kind of dialogue with 
each other and which are largely determined by biology, genetics and evolution.
 Poststructuralism radicalizes these forms of suspicion, all directed against the 
idea that subjects are free and competent to give an accurate account of themselves, by 
further problematising a number of aspects, many of them related to the specific 
understanding of language (as based on Saussurean linguistics, namely that language is 
an abstract and culturally constructed system of (often binary) differences). Lacan 
rereads Freud in terms of linguistics and differentiates within each subject between an 
imaginary (narcissistic), symbolic (social) and real (unconscious) order. The conscious 
subject, for Lacan, is based on a double misrecognition – a narcissistic misrecognition 
with an idealised other and a social misrecognition based on an equally narcissistic 
illusion of mastering language. Both identity and language, however, come from an 
other, which means that the subject is identified and spoken rather than being in control 
of his or her auto- (or, rather, auto-hetero-) biography. 
Althusser brings together Lacanian psychoanalysis, a Marxist understanding of 
ideology and aspects of (Saussure’s and Benveniste’s) linguistics. For him, the subject 
is fundamentally an addressing device, a pronoun shifter that allows to connect between 
a ‘you’ with a ‘me/I/we’, and to switch between these, through the mechanism of 
hailing. It is because subjects can be subjected to an address (by other subjects) that 
they can become subjects in the first place. A subject is therefore first and foremost a 
position or positioning, or a vulnerability in terms of lacking awareness about the very 
fact of being positioned (hence the ideological misrecognition of the liberal subject 
being interpellated as ‘free’). The necessary but unacceptable position of the subject of 
autobiography would lie in the fact that ‘I’ write about my ‘self’ as the ‘free’ subject of 
my own (life) narrative, or ‘I’ ‘am’ the main character in ‘my’ ‘own’ life story. 
Foucault adds to this an analysis of the larger discursive power structures that 
work as much at a ‘micro’, or, individual, level as on larger, societal, or ‘macro’, level. 
Instead of oppression, modern societies rely on self-disciplining through processes of 
bio-politics, subjectivity and embodiment. A subject for Foucault is a subject of (i.e. 
both exercising and receiving) power who adapts to socio-political pressures by 
working on ‘it(s) self’. An autobiography in the Foucauldian sense can therefore only 
be the inscription of biopolitics into a narrative by a more or less empowered self as 
subject. 
Both Levinas and Derrida stress another aporia at the heart of the subject and 
therefore of autobiography. There is a temporal and spatial delusion at work in the idea 
of a subject’s self-presence. The subject is the effect of an ‘Other’ (who, in Levinas’s 
theological model, is ultimately God, as experienced in the face of another human; in 
Derrida, this other is an unknowable who has the structure of a trace or of ‘différance’ 
– a ‘non-present’ presence that can never be made present as such because it is always 
deferred and thus always differs from itself, like a trace). This other always precedes 
and gives rise to the subject’s impression of self-presence and identity – an identity 
which is, in fact, always merely an identity which comes to ‘me’ from an ‘earlier’ but 
‘unknowable’ ‘Other. 
In order to show the implications of this deconstruction of the autobiographical 
it is helpful to return to Paul de Man’s notion of autobiography as ‘defacement’. This 
deconstruction, as usual, begins with a raising of the stakes or the generalisation of the 
autobiographical genre: 
 
[autobiography] …is not a genre or a mode, but a figure of reading or of 
understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts. The autobiographical 
moment happens as an alignment between the two subjects involved in the 
process of reading in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive 
substitution. The structure implies differentiation as well as similarity, since 
both depend on a substitutive exchange that constitutes the subject. This 
specular structure is interiorized in a text in which the author declares himself 
the subject of his own understanding, but this merely makes explicit the wider 
claim to authorship that takes place whenever a text is stated to be by someone 
and assumed to be understandable to the extent that this is the case. Which 
amounts to saying that any book with a readable title page is, to some extent, 
autobiographical. (de Man, 1984: 70) 
 
As de Man continues: “The interest of autobiography, then, is not that it reveals reliable 
self-knowledge – it does not – but that it demonstrates in a striking way the 
impossibility of closure and of totalization (that is the impossibility of coming into 
being) of all textual systems made up of tropological substitutions” (71).  
The key figure of the autobiographical genre is prosopopeia [prosopon poien, 
to confer a mask or a face (prosopon)], which is “the trope of autobiography, by which 
one’s name... is made as intelligible and memorable as a face. Our topic deals with the 
giving and taking away of faces, with face and deface, figure, figuration and 
disfiguration” (76). As de Man explains: 
As soon as we understand the rhetorical function of prosopopeia as positing 
voice or face by means of language, we also understand that what we are 
deprived of is not life but the shape and the sense of a world accessible only 
in the privative way of understanding. Death is a displaced name for a 
linguistic predicament, and the restoration of mortality by autobiography (the 
prosopopeia of the voice and the name) deprives and disfigures to the precise 
extent that it restores. Autobiography veils a defacement of the mind of which 
it is itself the cause. (80-81) 
 
The masked subjectivity of autobiography thus significantly challenges the 
autoaffective desire that underlies the autobiographical urge. 
A further complication is provided by Derrida through the notion of auto-
hetero-bio-graphy: 
 
Autobiography, the writing of the self as living, the trace of the living for itself, 
being for itself, the auto-affection or auto-infection as memory or archive of 
the living would be an immunizing movement (...), but an immunizing 
movement that is always threatened with becoming auto-immunizing, as is 
every autos, every ipseity, every automatic, automobile, autonomous, 
autoreferential movement. Nothing risks becoming more poisonous than an 
autobiography, poisonous for itself in the first place, auto-infectious for the 
presumed signatory who is so auto-affected. (2002: 415) 
 
Furthermore, the ‘poisonous’ nature of auto(hetero)biography is exacerbated by the fact 
that, like any text or writing, inscription comes at the price of iterability. Not only do 
‘I’ write ‘my’ autobiography (literally or metaphorically) as if I were an ‘other’ but I 
also, in writing it, am in a position of ‘as-if-I-were-dead’, hence Derrida’s additional 
twist: autobiography thus becomes ‘auto-hetero-thanato-graphy’: 
 
But what does it mean to be dead, when you are not totally dead? It means that 
you look at things the way they are as such, you look at the object as such. To 
perceive the object as such implies that you perceive the object as it is or as it 
is supposed to be when you are not there... So, to relate to an object as such 
means to relate to it as if you were dead. That’s the condition of truth, the 
condition of perception, the condition of objectivity, at least in their most 
conventional sense. (18) (…) What is absolutely scary is the idea of being dead 
while being quasi-dead, while looking at things from above, from beyond. But 
at the same time, it is the most reassuring hope we have that, although dead, 
we will continue to look, to listen to everything, to observe what’s going on. 
(20) (…) I think it is bearable only because of the as if: ‘as if I were dead’. But 
the as if, the fiction, the quasi-, these are what protect us from the real event 
of death itself, if such a thing exists. (2000 [1995]: 22) 
 
If every autobiography is written from the autoaffective point of view ‘as if I were dead’ 
the shift towards life writing might itself be seen as an ‘autoimmunitarian’ reaction in 
the context of generalised biopolitics. 
Following the biopolitical shift from autobiography or life writing to a 
posthumanist notion in which the (grammatical) subject or agent of the phrase can no 
longer clearly be disentangled from its object opens up the possibility for all kinds of 
postanthropocentric forms of life writing to emerge. In fact, the very ‘bios’ in 
autobiography – as explained above – dissolves and generalises at the same time. 
The autobiographic genre thus ‘faces’ further proliferation and fragmentation as 
a result of a posthumanist and postanthropocentric ecology. Every component of the 
term ‘auto-bio-graphy’ is being challenged afresh by posthumanism: to briefly 
recapitulate, the auto- in autobiography is seen as an instance of auto-affection, which 
relies on an inappropriable (inhuman) other. The bio- in autobiography is exposed to 
the challenge as to what constitutes the biological element in every narration of a ‘life’; 
finally, the question of writing in autobiography is being raised again with more 
urgency by new forms and media of inscription. It is, for example, worth remembering 
that the Derridean notion of the trace was from the start never restricted to any human 
logic of writing, or to forms of inscription exclusively effectuated by human subjects 
(Derrida, 1976: 9). Under these conditions, it is no surprise that as the forms of 
subjectivity proliferate the genre of autobiography becomes more and more fragmented 
and subdivided into autofiction, life writing, memoir, autobio(s)copie, etc. (cf. for 
example Lejeune, 1998). The autobiographical genre is the embodiment of the aporia 
of subjectivity: who is the addressee of one’s autobiography? Derrida explains the 
conundrum at the heart of the autobiographical by, first of all, insisting on the problem 
of self-identity and the name, i.e. ‘Am I that name?’, and on the question of who is 
behind the figure of figuration, the defaced behind the face? Judith Butler’s explanation, 
in Giving an Account of Oneself, is very helpful here: 
 
The ‘I’ can tell neither the story of its own emergence nor the conditions of its 
own possibility without bearing witness to a state of affairs to which one could 
not have been present, which are prior to one’s own emergence as a subject 
who can know, and so constitute a set of origins that one can narrate only at 
the expense of authoritative knowledge. (Butler, 2005: 37) 
 
Derrida articulates the problematic desire behind the autobiographical impulse through 
the relationship between auto-affection and death, i.e. the autobiographical ‘scene of 
writing’ necessarily passes through death (as seen in the passage from ‘As If I Were 
Dead’ (Derrida, 2000) quoted above) and the impossibility of externalising one’s 
innermost autobiographical experience. But what does it mean to be dead, when at the 
moment of writing (or speaking) you are obviously alive? It means, according to 
Derrida, ‘that you look at things the way they are as such, you look at the object as 
such. To perceive the object as such implies that you perceive the object as it is or as it 
is supposed to be when you are not there... So, to relate to an object as such means to 
relate to it as if you were dead. That’s the condition of truth, the condition of perception, 
the condition of objectivity, at least in their most conventional sense’ (Derrida 2000: 
18). It is the necessarily fictional aspect of the autobiographical or of life writing in 
general, that allows both for the best and the worst, absolute fear and uplifting hope, 
that constitutes the autobiographical impulse or desire: 
  
What is absolutely scary is the idea of being dead while being quasi-dead, while 
looking at things from above, from beyond. But at the same time, it is the most 
reassuring hope we have that, although dead, we will continue to look, to listen 
to everything, to observe what’s going on… I think it is bearable only because of 
the as if: ‘as if I were dead’. But the as if, the fiction, the quasi-, these are what 
protect us from the real event of death itself, if such a thing exists. (Derrida 2000: 
20, 22) 
 
An autobiography is thus, strictly (fictionally) speaking, ‘deadly’ in the sense that it 
requires a self-positioning based on an identification with another, objectified, or 
‘dead’, me – a relation to me as other that is regulated by unpredictable because 
unconscious processes of auto-immuno-in- or affection. 
 
 
From Life Writing to Lifewriting: Postanthropocentrism and Autobiography 
 
At this point, it is important to stress that sustainability is about decentering 
anthropocentrism. The ultimate implication is a displacement of the human in 
the new, complex compound of highly generative posthumanities. In my view, 
the sustainable subject has a nomadic subjectivity because the notion of 
sustainability brings together ethical, epistemological, and political concerns 
under cover of a nonunitary vision of the subject… ‘Life’ privileges 
assemblages of a heterogeneous kind. Animals, insects, machines are as many 
fields of forces or territories of becoming. The life in me is not only, not even 
human. (Braidotti 189-90) 
 
An additional complication in the proliferation of the autobiographical is the question 
of ‘zoography’ (or, the involvement of the “animal autrobiographique” (Derrida, 2012: 
415) in giving an account of oneself). What part does ‘my’ animal-life (i.e. the human 
body or embodiment as such) – the zoē as opposed to the bio of any ‘me’ (cf. Agamben 
1998) – play in life writing or autobiography? There always seems to be an elusive 
zoographical trace underneath and a zoo-ontological other who precedes and ‘writes’, 
a biography, as Judith Butler explains: 
 
To be a body is, in some sense, to be deprived of having a full recollection of 
one’s life. There is a history to my body of which I can have no recollection… 
If there is, then, a part of bodily experience as well – of what is indexed by the 
word exposure – that cannot be narrated but constitutes the bodily condition 
of one’s narrative account of oneself, then exposure constitutes one among 
several vexations in the effort to give a narrative account of oneself. There is 
(1) a non-narrativizable exposure that establishes my singularity, and there are 
(2) primary relations, irrecoverable, that form lasting and recurrent 
impressions in the history of my life, and so (3) a history that establishes my 
partial opacity to myself. Lastly, there are (4) norms that facilitate my telling 
about myself but that I do not author and that render me substitutable at the 
very moment that I seek to establish the history of my singularity. This last 
dispossession in language is intensified by the fact that I give an account of 
myself to someone, so that the narrative structure of my account is superseded 
by (5) the structure of address in which it takes place. (Butler, 2005: 38-39) 
 
Death and obliteration at the heart of the autobiographical autoaffection is thus to be 
taken literally, following Butler: “To be a body is, in some sense, to be deprived of 
having a full recollection of one’s life. There is a history to my body of which I can 
have no recollection” (Butler, 2005: 38). 
The indispensable writing body has its own zoographical ways of inscription 
that may not be articulable in traditional forms of autobiographical writing and works 
against the idea that autobiography as a genre usually relies on the authenticity of 
(bodily) experience. There is thus always an experience of dispossession (or 
desubjectification) at work, which is experienced (or inscribed, registered) at a material, 
bodily level, and which is the necessary precondition for autoaffection to arise in the 
first place, but which can never be narrated as such. The body who experiences (or is 
materially inscribed by) the autobiography can never be the body who narrates the 
autobiography. There is, in fact, a disjuncture between bodies at work within the 
autobiographical process: material, somatic, phenomenological, narrating and narrated, 
to name but a few. This disjuncture is mediated and produced by technics (from 
speaking and writing to microchips and new social media (cf. Smith, 2011: 570 ff)) and 
is giving way to the awareness that an autobiography is always a recording of two 
identities, an individual, ‘personal’ one that is singular, or a ‘haecceity’, as well as a 
species, ‘bodily’ one, that is entangled with its technical and planetary environment. 
In the context of an emergent global environmental consciousness as well as 
ambient ‘species angst’ regarding the survival of human and nonhuman life on Earth, 
the genre of lifewriting is taking on species and planetary dimensions. Autobiography 
in the Anthropocene, or lifewriting in the face of extinction, however, should maybe 
regarded with some scepticism, as Claire Colebrook explains: 
 
History is no longer a human narrative, and human narratives themselves seem 
to incorporate forces that are no longer human. … not only have we humanized 
the emergence of humans from deep time (by regarding evolution as being 
oriented towards adaptation), but we have also domesticated the sense of the 
human end… Rather than celebrating or affirming a post-human world, where 
man no longer deludes himself with regard to his primacy or distinction, and 
rather than asserting the joyous truth of ecology where life is finally 
understood as one vast, self-furthering interconnected organic whole, we 
should perhaps take note of the violent distinction of the human. For some 
time now, humans have been proclaiming their capacity to render themselves 
figurally extinct. All those claims for man’s specialness, for the distinction of 
reason, for human exceptionalism have given way to claims for unity, 
mindfulness, the global brain and a general ecology… But his sense of human 
absence is not only delusional; it is symptomatic and psychotic… precisely 
when man ought to be a formidable presence, precisely when we should be 
confronting the fact that the human species is exceptional in its distinguishing 
power, we affirm that there is one single, interconnected, life-affirming 
ecological totality. (Colebrook, 2011) 
 
The ‘figural’ disappearance of the human (singular and species) is inscribed in the very 
desire of autobiographical autoaffection. At a time of growing extinction threats and 
planetary entanglement it would be hazardous to forget this. Life is nothing outside 
narration – humans’ special responsibility, one could say. But without life there would 
be nothing to narrate… 
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